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Revisiting European influence: the case of agricultural 
trade negotiations ŧ 
 
Patricia Garcia-Duran*, Benjamin Kienzle** and Montserrat Millet*** 
 
In recent years, scholars have called into question the often-heard policy statements 
that link a stronger single voice of the European Union (EU) to more European 
influence in international negotiations. This article examines this challenge in an area 
where the EU has a particularly long tradition of establishing common policies: 
agriculture. By comparing in particular the international agricultural negotiations that 
have taken place in the framework of the Uruguay and the Doha Development Rounds 
(up until Cancún), it argues that internal coherence is actually not a sufficient condition 
for EU influence in these negotiations. On the contrary, by building on different strands 
of literature – International Relations, EU studies and trade policy – it shows that the 
EU’s ability to influence outcomes has been increasingly affected by external 
developments. More specifically, the article draws on three crucial external processes 
in this regard: First, emerging powers have gained substantial commercial weight. 
Second, key countries, especially Brazil, have played an increasingly active role in the 
negotiations. Third, these countries have strengthened their positions through 
successful coalition-building. Consequently, if European policy-makers want to 
increase the EU’s influence in agricultural trade negotiations, they have to more 
consciously adapt its negotiation approaches to the changing external negotiation 
environment. 
 
ŧ This article falls within the EU-IANUS research project (The EU in an unsettled 
International system: crisis, polarity and multilateralism) funded by the National R+D 
Plan of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competiveness (CSO2012-33361). The 
authors would like to thank Esther Barbé and the other EU-IANUS researchers for their 
valuable support and input. They are also happy to acknowledge the helpful comments 
by Tom Delreux and the participants of a panel on ‘EU Performance in multilateral 
institutions: theory and cases’ at the EUSA Biennial Conference 2013, where an earlier 
version of this paper was presented. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Since the early days of European integration in external affairs, policy-makers have 
continuously emphasized the need to speak and act more coherently if the European 
Union (EU) wants to become a more influential actor on the international stage. In 
recent years, however, the relation between internal coherence and external influence 
has been increasingly problematized by academics. The empirical evidence suggesting 
that more coherence does not necessarily lead to more influence is growing slowly.1 In 
this regard, one of the crucial test cases implicates the area of trade and commerce, in 
which the EU has achieved one of the highest degrees of internal coherence. The Rome 
Treaties committed member states early on to act collectively in international trade 
negotiations. Most notably, the EU represents its member states at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), as it had previously done at the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) meetings.2 Moreover, the EU has tried to improve its coherence in these 
forums through various Treaty reforms in the 1990s and 2000s. Yet, even with regard to 
matters of trade and commerce, increasing coherence has not always brought about 
                                                          
1 Karen E. Smith, Speaking with One Voice? European Union Co-ordination on Human Rights Issues at 
the United Nations, 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 1, 113–137 (2006); Karen E. Smith (2010), 
The European Union at the Human Rights Council: Speaking with One Voice but Having Little Influence, 
17 Journal of European Public Policy 2, 224–241 (2010); Alasdair R. Young, The Rise (and Fall?) of the 
EU’s Performance in the Multilateral Trading System, 33 Journal of European Integration 6, 715–729 
(2011); Daniel C. Thomas, Still Punching below Its Weight? Coherence and Effectiveness in European 
Union Foreign Policy, 50 Journal of Common Market Studies 3, 457–474 (2012); Arne Niemann and 
Charlotte Bretherton, EU External Policy at the Crossroads: The Challenge of Actorness and 
Effectiveness, 27 International Relations 3, 261-275 (2013). 
2 The WTO was founded on 1 January 1995 as a result of agreements reached during the Uruguay Round. 
This international organization is the successor to the GATT and incorporates all the new agreements 
reached during the Round. 
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growing EU impact on international trade negotiations.3 How is it possible to explain 
this? 
As has been lamented already,4 little systematic research has been done to 
answer this question. The few studies that examine the relation between coherence and 
influence tend to emphasize different internal factors. Some highlight, for example, the 
importance of how the negotiation competence is delegated within the EU5 and related 
issues such as internal voting rules.6 Others point to efficiency problems when the EU 
spends more time negotiating for the sake of internal cohesion among member states 
and European institutions than negotiating with third parties.7 Groenleer and van 
Schaick,8 for their part, emphasize the importance of converging norms and preferences 
among member states. Likewise, Thomas emphasizes the importance of political 
cohesion within the EU and the determinacy of its policies.9 
However, these studies suffer generally from two shortcomings that make a 
more systematic analysis of the relation between coherence and international influence 
more difficult. The first problem is the lack of historical comparisons within the same 
issue areas. So far, most studies offer single case studies or comparisons between 
different issue areas. Yet, by comparing two similar cases in the same issue area over 
time, it is possible to scrutinize in greater detail how in some cases the EU maintains or 
increases its coherence, but is not able to consolidate its influence. Second, other 
sources of power in international trade negotiations,10 most notably external factors, 
often get obscured in favour of a focus on internal coherence within the EU. Although 
some studies consider external dimensions, for example in the form of recognition by 
                                                          
3 Young, supra n. 1; Manfred Elsig, The EU as an Effective Trade Power? Strategic Choice of Judicial 
Candidates in the Context of the World Trade Organization, 27 International Relations 3, 325-340 
(2013). 
4 Thomas, supra n. 1. 
5 Joseph Jupille and James A. Caporaso, ‘States, Agency, and Rules: The European Union in Global 
Environmental Politics’, in C. Rhodes (ed.), The European Union in the World Community (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, 1998); Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation 
of Trade Authority in the EU, 37 Journal of Common Market Studies 3, 477–501 (1999). 
6 Sophie Meunier, What Single Voice? European Institutions and EU-U.S. Trade Negotiations, 54 
International Organization 1, 103–135 (2000); Mark Rhinard and Michael Kaeding, The International 
Bargaining Power of the European Union in “Mixed” Competence Negotiations: The Case of the 2000 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 5, 1023–1050 (2006). 
7 Smith, supra n. 1. 
8 Martijn L.P. Groenleer and Louise G. Van Schaik, United We Stand? The European Union’s 
International Actorness in the Cases of the International Criminal Court and the Kyoto Protocol, 45 
Journal of Common Market Studies 5, 969-998 (2007). 
9 Thomas, supra n. 1. 
10 Peter Drahos, When the Weak Bargain with the Strong: Negotiations in the World Trade Organization, 
8 International Negotiation 1, 79–109 (2003). 
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third parties,11 or in the form of the negotiation environment and ‘opportunity 
structures’,12 they do not highlight sufficiently that, ultimately, influence in international 
affairs is mutually dependent on the influence of other actors. 
This article addresses these shortcomings by comparing two historical cases in a 
special case of trade policy: agriculture, in particular international agricultural 
negotiations that have taken place within two frameworks, namely the Uruguay Round 
and the Doha Development Round (up to the Cancún Talks). We have chosen this field 
of negotiations due to its specific characteristics. It is well known that agriculture is 
different from other areas of trade due largely to the interventionist nature of the 
Common Agricultural Policy and the disparity of positions of EU member states in this 
area. Hence the EU negotiating position is expected both to be linked intimately to what 
is going on domestically within the CAP and to be less flexible than in other areas.13 
This in turn should help compare the impact of internal coherence on international 
influence in the two Rounds. 
This agriculture-specific analysis demonstrates that internal coherence cannot 
explain the loss of the EU’s capacity of influence in international trade negotiations. In 
other words, even though the Union’s coherence has hardly varied in absolute terms, its 
influence has decreased in relative terms, that is, in relation to other actors, particularly 
emerging powers in the global South. In short, external factors have become dominant. 
Although the rise of new power centres is a common theme in the recent literature on 
EU external relations,14 this article examines how the power shifts in international 
commercial relations have manifested themselves in the informal decision-making 
process of the Uruguay and Doha Rounds. More specifically, by building a bridge 
between different strands of literature in International Relations, EU studies and trade 
policy it outlines three concrete processes that have undermined the EU’s influence over 
time. First, the developing countries’ commercial power relative to the EU has changed 
significantly to the detriment of the Union. Second, developing countries, most notably 
Brazil, have been able to translate their increasing share in international commerce by 
                                                          
11 Jupille and Caporaso, supra n. 5. 
12 Meunier, supra n. 6; Charlotte Bretherton,and John Vogler, A Global Actor Past Its Peak?, 27 
International Relations 3, 375–390 (2013). 
13 Sophie Meunier, Trading Voices: The European Union in International Commercial Negotiations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Carsten Daugbjerg and Alan Swinbank, The Politics of 
CAP Reform: Trade Negotiations, Institutional Settings and Blame Avoidance, 45 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 1, 1-22 (2007); Daugbjerg and Swinbank, Curbing Agricultural Exceptionalism: The 
EU’s Response to External Challenge, 31 The World Economy 5, 631-652 (2008). 
14 See, for example, Michael Smith, Beyond the Comfort Zone: Internal Crisis and External Challenge in 
the European Union’s Response to Rising Powers, 89 International Affairs 3, 653-671 (2013). 
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becoming effective coalition-builders in international trade negotiations. Third, 
developing countries’ discontent with the results of the Uruguay Round, as the benefits 
derived from the agreement were less than expected, have strengthened their resolve in 
the negotiations themselves and have furthered their willingness to contest the 
dominance of the EU and the United States. These processes have been underpinned by 
ideational shifts regarding the growth model in developing countries—shifts which have 
promoted greater interest on the parts of these countries in international trade 
negotiations since the Uruguay Round. 
The structure of this article is threefold. First, we revisit briefly the concepts of 
EU coherence and influence in the context of the sources of power in international 
agricultural negotiations. The second section focuses on the comparison of the Uruguay 
and Doha Rounds. It empirically shows both that it is possible to compare the Doha 
Round up until Cancún with the Uruguay Round in the field of agricultural negotiations 
and that the Cancún fiasco cannot be explained by a decrease in EU internal coherence. 
Third, we examine why the EU’s influence has decreased between Uruguay and Cancún 
by examining the three processes outlined above in more depth. Finally, we summarize 
our research findings in light of the existing literature and examine their policy 
implications. 
 
 
2 BEYOND COHERENCE: REVISITING INFLUENCE IN TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS 
 
In international trade negotiations, the EU—like any other actor—can draw on different 
sources of bargaining power to wield influence in its favour. One of these sources is 
certainly the internal set-up of the actor.15 In the case of the EU, this internal approach 
to bargaining power is reflected in the classical literature on EU coherence, which 
habitually attributes the lack of EU influence in international affairs to its lack of 
internal coherence.16 From this classical perspective, coherence is largely seen as an 
                                                          
15 Drahos, supra n. 10, p. 83. 
16 Kathleen R. McNamara and Sophie Meunier, Between National Sovereignty and International Power: 
What External Voice for the Euro?, 78 International Affairs 4, 849–868 (2002); Marcela Szymanski and 
Michael E. Smith, Coherence and Conditionality in European Foreign Policy: Negotiating the EU-
Mexico Global Agreement, 43 Journal of Common Market Studies 1, 171–192 (2005); Richard G. 
Whitman, The EU: Standing Aside from the Changing Global Balance of Power?, 30 Politics S1, 24–32 
(2010). 
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institutional issue. That is, coherence (and thus more European influence on the 
international stage) can be achieved through certain institutional arrangements that 
foster the integration of member states and their policies.17 In this regard, the existence 
of common policies supported actively by EU institutions and member states are usually 
seen as a clear indicator of EU coherence.18 
This institutional view is particularly prevalent in the EU studies literature on 
international trade, in which the relations between the Commission—the EU’s agent in 
trade negotiations—and the Council and the member states have become the centre of 
attention. More specifically, the focus is on the variation in the Commission’s autonomy 
vis-à-vis the Council and the member states and, thus, on the variation over time of the 
EU’s coherence.19 Whereas some argue that the Commission is merely a ‘spokesperson 
with privileges’,20 with a limited capacity to act independently of the control 
mechanisms of the member states,21 others maintain that issues like the Commission’s 
broad negotiation mandates or its privileged information of negotiations provide a high 
degree of autonomy.22 Thus, Elsig claims: ‘The agent in the field of European Union 
trade policy has more discretion than is usually the case for agents in international 
organizations’.23 
Yet, despite their differences, all contributions to this debate have one major 
aspect in common: they are dominantly inward-looking approaches that share, at the 
end of the day, the underlying emphasis on coherence as a crucial source of more 
influence. As a result, they often sideline the broader picture of international trade 
negotiations, that is, they do not expound upon or identify in-depth external factors that 
may influence the EU’s bargaining power in such negotiations. It comes, therefore, as 
                                                          
17 Simon Nuttall, ‘Coherence and Consistency’, in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds.), 
International Relations and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
18 Thomas, supra n. 1. 
19 Eugénia da Conceiçáo-Heldt, Who Controls Whom? Dynamics of Power Delegation and Agency Losses 
in EU Trade Politics, 48 Journal of Common Market Studies 4, 1107–1126 (2010). 
20 Chad Damro, EU Delegation and Agency in International Trade Negotiations: A Cautionary 
Comparison, 45 Journal of Common Market Studies 4, 883–903 (2007), p. 900. 
21 Dirk De Bièvre and Andreas Dür, Constituency Interests and Delegation in European and American 
Trade Policy, 38 Comparative Political Studies 10, 1271–1296 (2005); M. Shawn Reichert and 
Bernadette M.E. Jungblut, European Union External Trade Policy: Multilevel Principal-Agent 
Relationships, 35 Policy Studies Journal 3, 395–418 (2007); Andreas Dür and Manfred Elsig, Principals, 
Agents, and the European Union’s Foreign Economic Policies, 18 Journal of European Public Policy 3, 
323–338 (2011); Arlo Poletti, World Trade Organization Judicialization and Preference Convergence in 
EU Trade Policy: Making the Agent’s Life Easier, 18 Journal of European Public Policy 3, 361–382 
(2011).  
22 Eugénia da Conceiçáo-Heldt, Variation in EU Member States’ Preferences and the Commission’s 
Discretion in the Doha Round, 18 Journal of European Public Policy 3, 403–419 (2011). 
23 Manfred Elsig, European Union Trade Policy after Enlargement: Larger Crowds, Shifting Priorities 
and Informal Decision-Making, 17 Journal of European Public Policy 6, 781–798 (2010), p. 789. 
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no surprise that this type of literature has difficulties in explaining why variation in 
coherence, for example in the form of more Commission autonomy, should actually fail 
to make the EU more influential. A look at the extensive literature on the EU’s 
international agricultural negotiations does not reveal new insights either, as work in 
this field has primarily been concerned with establishing whether there is a relationship 
between these negotiations and the evolution of the common agricultural policy (CAP), 
for instance on the link between the development of the CAP and EU positions in 
international trade negotiations. In other words, scholars have analyzed the extent to 
which international negotiations and CAP reforms have influenced each other rather 
than the sources of EU influence in the negotiations.24 
Given these shortcomings, it becomes necessary to go beyond internal factors in 
order to explain the variation of EU influence in international agricultural negotiations. 
As Drahos pointed out in his analysis of international trade negotiations, apart from 
internal coherence, there are at least three more basic sources of bargaining power in 
international trade negotiations: (1) commercial power in terms of an actor’s 
international market share; (2) the establishment of effective networks to gather relevant 
commercial information; and (3) the ability to build efficient coalitions.25 In the case of 
the EU, the information-gathering networks were already well established during the 
Uruguay Round.26 As there is no reason to believe that this factor varied substantially 
between the Uruguay and Doha Rounds, the analysis of the other two factors is the most 
pertinent way forward. The first one, the EU’s commercial power vis-à-vis other actors, 
has been already identified as an important variable in international commercial 
relations and is directly related to the concept of relative power in the International 
Relations literature on cooperation. In this regard, the emergence of new powers has 
been the most recurrent theme.27 As Blavoukos and Bourantonis have pointed out in a 
                                                          
24 Francesc Granell, Montserrat Millet and Patricia Garcia-Duran, ‘The WTO as a Determining Factor for 
the CAP and the Euro-Mediterranean Process’, in Juan-Ramón Cuadrado-Roura and Maria Teresa 
Fernández-Fernández (eds.), The Euro-Mediterranean Free-Trade Area (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2005); 
Robert Ackrill, Adrian Kay and Wyn Morgan, The Common Agricultural Policy and Its Reform: The 
Problem of Reconciling Budget and Trade Concerns, 56 Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 4, 
393-411 (2008); Alison Burrell, The CAP: Looking Back, Looking Ahead, 31 Journal of European 
Integration 3, 271–289 (2009); Carsten Daugbjerg and Alan Swinbank, Explaining the ‘Health Check’ of 
the Common Agricultural Policy: Budgetary Politics, Globalisation and Paradigm Change Revisited, 32 
Policy Studies 2, 127-141 (2011); supra n. 13. 
25 Drahos, supra n. 10, pp. 82-83. 
26 Ibid. p. 83. 
27 Young, supra n. 1; Elsig, supra n. 3; Lisanne Groen and Arne Niemann, The European Union at the 
Copenhagen Climate Negotiations: A Case of Contested EU Actorness and Effectiveness, 27 International 
Relations 3, 317-318 (2013). 
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recent volume, ‘…systemic changes, related not least to the ascendance of new 
powerful actors in world trade negotiations (i.e., the BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, 
India and China, with Russia not yet a WTO member), have undermined the EU 
international economic role’.28 The second factor, coalition-building ability, has rarely 
come up in the literature on the EU. However, it has already been shown how other 
actors in international trade negotiations, most notably developing countries, have been 
able to increase their influence vis-à-vis the US and the European Union by forming 
counter-coalitions.29 
Before analyzing whether these factors are actually related to EU influence in 
the agricultural negotiations in Uruguay and Doha, it is first necessary to define what is 
meant by ‘influence’. Although the term is certainly murky and widely debated, it is 
directly related to the relatively straightforward concepts used in other studies on EU 
foreign policy, in particular goal attainment,30 the ‘effectiveness in impact’31 or simply 
‘impact’ in the sense of ‘effects of EFP [European Foreign Policy] activity on 
international political and functional issues’32. Following the definition of these 
concepts ‘influence’ can be defined as instrumental power, that is, as the ability to affect 
outcomes in line with the EU’s common policies. As in the case of the related concepts, 
it is essential to link the observed effects with the actual activities implemented by the 
EU.33 
 
 
3 FROM URUGUAY TO CANCÚN: THE EU IN AGRICULTURAL 
NEGOTIATIONS 
 
For more than 25 years, intense international agricultural negotiations have taken place 
within the Uruguay and the Doha Development Round. This analysis does not attempt 
to explain in detail the agricultural negotiations that took place in the two Rounds or the 
                                                          
28 Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis, ‘Conclusion’, in Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris 
Bourantonis (eds.), The EU Presence in International Organizations (London: Routledge, 2011), p. 174. 
29 Amrita Narlikar and Diana Tussie (2004), The G20 at the Cancun Ministerial: Developing Countries 
and Their Evolving Coalitions in the WTO, 27 The World Economy 7, 947–966 (2004); Drahos, supra n. 
10. 
30 Niemann and Bretherton, supra n. 1, pp.267-268. 
31 Elsig, supra n. 3, p. 328. 
32 Roy H. Ginsberg, The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), p. 49. 
33 Thomas, supra n. 1, pp. 460-461. 
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details of the different actor positions in the negotiations. Rather we present the analysis 
of the EU’s key role in these negotiations in a comparative way so as to highlight two 
points. First, that the comparison should be made between the negotiations that took 
place as part of the Uruguay Round with those of the Doha Round up to the Cancún 
Talks. Second, that even though the Union’s coherence has hardly varied in absolute 
terms between both Rounds, its influence has decreased in relative terms. 
 
 
3.1 THE VALIDITY OF THE COMPARISON 
 
The peculiarities regarding the two Rounds suggest comparing the Uruguay Round 
through to its completion and the Doha Round only to the Cancún Ministerial (instead 
of up until now or up until the 2008 revised draft modalities). As explained below, the 
similarities are stronger between these two periods making the comparison 
methodologically more attractive. 
The Doha Round up until now only shares two similarities with the Uruguay 
Round. The first similarity regards the relations between the EU and the other actors. 
The recognition of the EU both as a valid and key actor in the international trade 
negotiations was not called into question by the creation of the WTO in 1995. While in 
the GATT the European Economic Community (EEC) was a de facto contracting party, 
formal or legal recognition of the EU as an actor in its own right came with the creation 
of the WTO. Moreover, recognition of the EU as an international actor has always gone 
hand in hand with its power status. The EU has been recognized by its peers, both in the 
GATT and the WTO, as a key actor in trade negotiations due to its market size and the 
volume of trade it generates.34 
The second similarity is related to the framework of negotiations. In Uruguay as 
in Doha, multilateral agricultural negotiations centred on three main pillars: market 
access, export subsidies, and domestic support – and could not be totally disassociated 
from other issues concerning trade in goods (above all those related to market access for 
non-agricultural products, trade defence measures, and issues of intellectual property) 
                                                          
34 Ole Elgström, Outsiders’ Perceptions of the European Union in International Trade Negotiations, 45 
Journal of Common Market Studies 4, 949–967 (2007); Caterina Carta, ‘Close Enough? The EU’s Global 
Role Described by Non-European Diplomats in Brussels’, in Sonia Lucarelli and Lorenzo Fioramonti 
(eds.), External Perceptions of the European Union as a Global Actor (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010); 
Young, supra n. 1. 
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and services, included on the agendas of both Rounds. In both cases, the negotiations 
have been subject to the ‘overall approach’, now referred to as the ‘single undertaking’, 
by which nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. In other words, if there is no 
agreement on agriculture, the Round cannot be concluded—even though agreements 
might have been reached in negotiations concerning goods and services and vice versa. 
The development that would have represented a significant change between Uruguay 
and Doha did not materialize. We refer to the exclusion of the agenda of three of the so-
called Singapore issues: competition policy, investment and government procurement. 
For this reason, it can be argued that the Doha principle of single undertaking covers the 
same topics as discussed in Uruguay.35 
The Uruguay Round and the Doha Round up until Cancún share three other 
important similarities. The first has to do with the internal EU model of governance. 
During the Uruguay Round and up until Cancún, the model of governance adopted 
before the GATT/WTO was the same. The member states granted the EU exclusive 
competence in its Common Commercial Policy and allowed the Commission full 
representation powers in international trade negotiations under the Council’s 
supervision. During that period, the EU had exclusive competence in the field of trade 
in goods (including agricultural products), and it had shared competence with the 
member states in the area of services, intellectual property, and foreign direct 
investment. Moreover, the fact that the competence of the EU was not exclusive in all 
these new areas of commerce did not impede its unity of representation in the 
international trade negotiations in Uruguay or in Cancún. In practice, the European 
Commission represented the member states in all the facets of the broad negotiation 
agendas at both Rounds, operating within the framework of the guidelines laid down by 
the Council.36 This model of governance has been changed by the Lisbon Treaty. The 
scope of the Common Commercial Policy has been extended and the European 
Parliament has been granted new powers in this arena.37 
Second, we can also find important similarities in relation with the EU’s 
negotiating position. Both in Uruguay and in Cancún, the position was initially 
                                                          
35 Bart Kerremans, ‘Delegation Chains, Agenda Control and Political Mobilisation: How the EU 
Commission Tries to Affect Domestic Mobilisation on the DDA’, in Thomas Cottier and Manfred Elsig 
(eds.), Governing the World Trade Organization: Past, Present and beyond Doha (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
36 Stephen Woolcock and Michael Hodges, ‘EU Policy in the Uruguay Round’, in Helen Wallace and 
William Wallace (eds.), Policy-Making in the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); 
Meunier, supra n. 13. 
37 Stephen Woolcock, European Union Economic Diplomacy (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012). 
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defensive. The EU wanted to preserve its common agricultural policy at all costs, while 
third countries sought to persuade the EU to reform it by offering greater market access, 
a reduction in export subsidies, and a reduction of domestic support to its farmers. 
Agricultural negotiations did not really begin until the EU reached an internal 
agreement to reform the CAP: in May 1992 for Uruguay and in June 2003 for Cancún. 
In both cases, these reforms expanded the EU’s margins for negotiating the three pillars 
of agricultural policy. Although the EU introduced some changes to the CAP both in 
2008 and in 2013, analysts agree that these cannot be considered reforms but revisions 
to adjust the policy instruments and/or to finish the implementation of previous 
reforms.38 If we consider that policy reform implies at least a change in the policy 
instruments that operate across the sector as a whole (or most parts of it), the CAP has 
so far gone through only two reforms: the MacSharry Reform in 1992 and the Fischler 
Reform in 2003.39 From this point of view, therefore, one may argue that 2003 for Doha 
was the negotiating time equivalent to 1992 for Uruguay.40 
Finally, and most importantly, both in Uruguay and in Cancún the EU tried the 
same negotiating strategy. In both cases the EU reached a bilateral agreement on 
agricultural issues with the US as the first step towards a multilateral agreement on 
agricultural issues and of a successful conclusion of the Round. Since then there have 
been no further attempts at reaching a bilateral agreement with the US. 
 
 
3.2 DECREASING INFLUENCE, STATIC COHERENCE 
 
On the basis of both these similarities and the classical literature on coherence, one 
would expect the EU negotiating strategy to have had the same degree of success in 
both cases unless evidence is found of a change in internal coherence. This section 
                                                          
38 Alan Swinbank, CAP Reform in the Shadow of the Eurozone Crisis and Deliberations over the 2014-20 
Financial Framework (communication for the First Conference of the Associazione Italiana di Economia 
Agraria e Applicata (AIEE) on ‘Towards a sustainable Bio-economy: Economic Issues and Policy 
Challenges’, University of Trento, 4-5 June 2012); Patricia Garcia-Duran and Montserrat Millet, The 
European financial crisis’ [lack of] impact on the Doha international trade negotiations on agricultural 
issues (communication for Stockholm University Workshop on ‘The Euro crisis–a catalyst for change? 
Examining the effects of the financial crisis on European Union policy?’, 18-19 April 2013). 
39 Wyn Grant, Policy Instruments in the Common Agricultural Policy, 33 West European Politics 1, 22-38 
(2010). 
40 We are very much aware that from other viewpoints this equivalence is more dubious. The 1992 CAP 
reform came late on in the Uruguay Round process. With Doha, however, many things were still up in the 
air, including the ‘Singapore Issues’. 
12 
 
shows, however, that while the EU level of influence was greater in Uruguay, the 
degree of coherence was at least equal in Cancún. 
In Uruguay as in Cancún, the EU and the US reached a bilateral agreement for 
the liberalization of agriculture. However, this bilateral agreement only became a 
multilateral agreement in Uruguay. In Cancún, the other parties to the negotiations 
rejected the bilateral agreement. 
In Uruguay, in November 1992, the EU signed a bilateral agreement with the 
US, which was subsequently accepted by the other participants in the Round and which 
allowed a final agreement to be reached. This bilateral agreement was known as the 
Blair House Agreement, and it effectively exhausted the margin for negotiation offered 
by the May 1992 CAP reform. In fact, France accused the EU of having exceeded this 
margin. In Doha, bilateral negotiations between the US and the EU also resulted in a 
joint proposal. The proposal was presented on 13 August 2003 and served as the basis 
for the draft presented by the WTO in Cancún. Thus, the Blair House model, which had 
helped unblock agricultural negotiations during the Uruguay Round, was reproduced. 
This time, however, the strategy failed. A new coalition, the Group known as the G20, 
was unwavering in its opposition to the US-EU agreement; the G20 presented an 
alternative proposal with greater demands for the liberalization of the three pillars of 
agricultural negotiations. In short, the EU and the US were not able to affect the 
outcomes of the Cancún talks in the same way as they had done during the Uruguay 
Round. 
Yet, the EU’s waning influence between the two rounds can hardly be attributed 
to the classical culprit in the literature: the hoarse single voice. In both Uruguay and 
Cancún, the reforms of the CAP served to ensure the convergence of the member states 
around a common negotiating position. Following Thomas,41 such a common position – 
and its pursuit by EU institutions and member states in the bilateral negotiations with 
the US – have been clear indicators of similar EU coherence. Furthermore, in both 
Rounds, the EU only became fully integrated in the agricultural negotiations after 
reaching an internal agreement for the reform of the CAP in May 1992 and in June 2003 
respectively. Before the reforms, the differences between the positions of the member 
states were so marked that EU had only been able to submit defensive proposals in 
support of the status quo, leaving the Commission without room for negotiation in 
agricultural issues. 
                                                          
41 Thomas, supra n. 1. 
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Although both reforms targeted only one of the pillars of international 
agricultural negotiations, that of domestic support, they allowed the EU to broaden its 
margins for negotiating the other two pillars. Protection from third countries in the 
farming sector (the market access pillar) and the need to employ export subsidies (the 
export subsidies pillar) are to a large extent the result of having established a system of 
internal intervention. Thus, if the degree of intervention is reduced, the degree of 
protection from third countries can also be reduced.42 The literature on the negotiations 
indicates that these reforms facilitated the Commission’s negotiating task.43 
To sum up, the international agricultural negotiations that have taken place 
within Uruguay and Cancún present strong similarities allowing for a methodologically 
sound comparison. The comparison, nevertheless, does not support the tenets of the 
classical literature on coherence. It reveals that internal coherence cannot explain the 
EU’s decreasing ability to influence the negotiation outcomes. 
 
 
4 THE RISE OF THE REST AND THE CHALLENGE TO 
EUROPEAN INFLUENCE 
 
An analysis of the international context during the Uruguay and Doha Rounds suggests 
that the key to understanding the different levels of influence wielded by the EU in 
these negotiations lies in changes in the power structure governing international trade 
negotiations. Both in GATT and WTO trade negotiations, decisions are made by 
consensus. What changed from Uruguay to Cancún is the way in which this consensus 
is reached. ‘Since Cancún, the old certainties about the structure and players in 
                                                          
42 Although a reform of the degree of intervention of the CAP in Europe’s internal market has 
implications for the necessary degree of external protection (or the EU’s margin for negotiation), it is also 
true that these implications are not clearly defined in the reform. Thus, we agree with Young (supra n. 1) 
that the most controversial aspects of the international trade negotiations on agriculture within the 
Council, following the reform, were those relating to market access and export subsidies. 
43 Hugo Paemen and Alexandra Bensch, Du GATT à l’OMC: La Communauté européenne dans 
l’Uruguay Round (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1995); John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading 
System: A History of the Uruguay Round, (London: Kluwer Law International, 1999); Montserrat Millet, 
La Regulación del Comercio Internacional: Del GATT a la OMC (Barcelona: La Caixa, 2001); Bart 
Kerremans, What Went Wrong in Cancun? A Principal-Agent View on the EU’s Rationale Towards the 
Doha Development Round, 9 European Foreign Affairs Review 3, 363-393 (2004); David N. Balaam, 
‘Agricultural Trade Policy’, in Brian Hocking and Steven McGuine (eds.), Trade Politics (London: 
Routledge, 2004); Meunier, supra n. 6; Daugbjerg and Swinbank, supra n. 13; Woolcock and Hodges, 
supra n. 36; Meunier, supra n. 13. 
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agriculture negotiations have been undermined’.44 The ‘Duo’ formed by the US and the 
EU in agricultural negotiations has been replaced by a ‘Quad’ formed by the US, the 
EU, Brazil, and India.45 
During the Uruguay Round, the decision-making process was in practice the one 
that had been in place since the birth of the EEC. The US and what is now the EU as a 
‘Duo’, or together with Japan and Canada as a ‘Quad’, formed the basic core around 
which the consensus was built. This system reflected the commercial power of these 
nations46 as well as the principal supplier rule established by the GATT—according to 
which it was implicitly accepted that the countries with the greatest stake and/or interest 
in the matter under negotiation should wield the most influence in any decisions reached 
regarding that matter.47 In Doha, by contrast, the developing countries, and India and 
Brazil in particular, managed to assume a new role in the decision-making process in 
agricultural issues through the so-called G20 coalition. In Cancún, the G20 was able to 
prevent the US-EU bilateral agreement from being accepted by the rest of the WTO 
members as it had been in Uruguay. As Laïdi put it: ‘The Cancún experience had great 
political significance because it revealed the emerging countries’ capacity to agree on a 
defensive political agenda in relation to the West, despite their diverging long-term 
interests’.48 
 
 
4.1 PROCESSES OF CHANGE 
 
Arguably, the emergence of this ‘new Quad’ can be attributed to three processes that 
were underpinned by ideational shifts regarding the growth model in developing 
countries. Until the end of the 1980s, developing countries followed a growth model 
based on import substitution. It was a model that required high levels of protection, 
                                                          
44 Robert Wolfe, New Groups in the WTO Agricultural Trade Negotiations: Power, Learning and 
Institutional Design, Canadian Agricultural Trade Policy Research Network Commissioned Paper, CP 
2006-2 (2006), p. 2. 
45 Although since 2003 different constellations have been tried out, involving four to seven states, the 
members of the G4 or new Quad have been part of all of them. See Amrita Narlikar, International Trade 
and Developing Countries: Bargaining Coalitions in the GATT & WTO (London: Routledge, 2003). 
46 Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in 
the GATT/WTO, 56 International Organization 2, 339–374 (2002); Meunier, supra n. 13; ibid. 
47 Mary E. Footer, ‘The WTO as a Living Instrument’, in Thomas Cottier and Manfred Elsig (eds.), 
Governing the World Trade Organization. Past, Present and beyond Doha (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010); Millet, supra n. 43. 
48 Zaki Laïdi, BRICS: Sovereignty Power and Weakness, 49 International Politics 5, 614-632 (2012), p. 
618. 
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which is why the GATT model based on reciprocal tariff concessions did not suit 
developing nations. In fact, in the early years of the GATT, the agendas of these 
countries were concerned with obtaining non-reciprocal concessions to secure access to 
the markets of developed countries. All such demands were disputed and negotiated in 
the UNCTAD, a United Nations forum created in 1964 specifically to address all issues 
related to trade and economic development, on the grounds that the GATT’s system of 
consensus was considered unsuited to achieving their demands.49 The outcome of the 
resulting agreements was the formalization of a special and differential treatment 
provision for developing countries in the GATT, via an exemption to the principle of 
reciprocity (1964), the creation of the Generalised System of Preferences (1971), and 
the introduction of the Enabling Clause (1979). 
These achievements, however, resulted in the passive participation of the 
developing countries in the GATT. It might be said that they acted as free riders—in 
that they were excluded from trade negotiations, and so did not have to reduce their 
protection levels, but still benefited from the tariff reductions negotiated by the 
developed countries through the Most Favoured Nation clause.50 The price they paid for 
this was the small degree of trade liberalization achieved in their main areas of interest 
in the GATT: trade in agricultural products and textiles. 
Parallel to the preparation and subsequent development of the Uruguay Round, 
however, a change was being experienced in the growth model of many developing 
countries, induced by the structural adjustment programmes implemented to resolve the 
external debt crisis of the 1980s. The realization that the import substitution model 
prevented the development of the export sector and resulted in largely uncompetitive 
firms encouraged the opening-up of trade and the elimination of trade restrictions as a 
means of revitalizing their economies.51 As a result, the developing countries began a 
unilateral process of trade liberalization that has contributed to a change both in their 
trade relations and in their traditional attitude to international trade. These changes have 
in turn led to the three processes that are behind the creation of the ‘new Quad’. 
                                                          
49 This process was led by the G77, a coalition of developing countries that campaigned for a new system 
of economic relations that might actually respond to the needs of economic development. 
50 The developing countries were not entirely marginalized. In fact, they used their influence in the 
consensus vote to ensure that the agendas of the Kennedy (1964–67) and Tokyo Rounds (1973–79) 
included issues of interest to them, albeit that this did not result in any specific agreements as these issues 
were gradually diluted in the course of negotiations. See Steinberg, supra n. 46. 
51 World Bank, World Development Report (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1987); Jagdish Bhagwati, El 
Proteccionismo (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1991); Millet, supra n. 43. 
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The first process has been a shift in global commercial power in favour of the 
developing countries. As is well known, in the 1990s, the so-called emerging economies 
gradually acquired a greater share of the world’s markets. Therefore, although the EU 
and the US remain the heavyweights of world trade, various developing countries have 
gained considerable ground in global economic and commercial systems, especially 
when operating as members of coalitions. Specifically, the G20 has sufficient political 
and economic influence to be a major actor in the agricultural trade negotiations 
conducted under the Doha framework. It includes the four BRICS countries (Brazil, 
India, China, and South Africa) that were WTO members—Russia only joined the 
WTO in summer 2012—and was the first coalition to include China. In the agricultural 
sector, it represents 69 per cent of the world’s farmers, more than half the world’s 
population, and 26 per cent of global agricultural trade. 
The second cause of the change in the nature of international agricultural 
negotiations between Uruguay and Doha is the discontent with the results of the 
Uruguay Round manifested by the developing countries. This was evident at the WTO 
Ministerial Conference held in Seattle in 1999, where these countries refused to agree to 
a new round of trade negotiations unless the Uruguay agreements were renegotiated.52 
Their refusal was justified on two grounds. First, the expected benefits of the 
liberalization of trade in agricultural products and textiles had not been forthcoming.53 
Second, the costs generated by the implementation of the new Uruguay agreements, 
especially as regards intellectual property rights and sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures, had been great.54 This explains why these countries have since placed the 
liberalization of trade in agricultural products at the top of their agenda and blocked the 
negotiation of any new trade issues. 
Finally, the third process leading to the creation of a ‘new Quad’ has been the 
progressive change in general attitude of the developing countries towards international 
                                                          
52 John S. Odell, Breaking Deadlocks in International Institutional Negotiations: The WTO, Seattle, and 
Doha, 53 International Studies Quaterly 2, 273–299 (2009); Sergi Sahin, Tracing the Repeated Failure of 
the Doha Development Trade Round from a Neo-Gramscian Perspective (communication for the 22nd 
World Congress of Political Science (IPSA), Madrid, 8–11 July, 2012). 
53 World Bank, Global Economic Prospects (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004); Rashid S. Kaukab, 
‘Coalitions and Alliance Strategies for Developing Countries in the Doha Round of Agricultural 
Negotiations’, in Alex F. McCalla and John Nash (eds.), Reforming Agricultural Trade for Developing 
Countries. Key Issues for a Pro-Development Outcome of the Doha Round (Vol. 1) (Washington, DC: 
World Bank, 2007); Narlikar, supra n. 45. 
54 J. Michael Finger, Implementing the Uruguay Round Agreements: Problems for Developing Countries, 
24 The World Economy 9, 1097–1108 (2001); World Bank, Global Economic Prospects (Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 2002). 
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trade negotiations. The G20 is, in part, a response to this change in thinking among the 
leaders of the developing countries. The fact that many developing countries have come 
to accept that trade very much forms a part of their development model has led them to 
have an interest in being active participants in international trade negotiations. As a 
result, these countries have developed an interest in becoming effective coalition-
builders in international trade negotiations despite their very diverse agricultural trade 
interests. 
 
 
4.2 COALITION-BUILDING AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
This attitude shift began during the Uruguay Round. The first attempt at making the 
voices of developing countries heard was embodied by the G10, a coalition of 
developing countries led by Brazil and India, whose aim was to boycott the inclusion of 
trade in services in the Uruguay Round talks. The inability of the developing countries 
to reach a consensus, however, caused the group to split. The second attempt was made 
through the adoption of a completely innovatory strategy: forging alliances with 
developed countries. 
The first alliance built on these lines resulted in the so-called Café au Lait 
coalition, formed by a group of developing countries that included dissidents from the 
G1055 (though neither Brazil nor India were among its members) and the group of 
developed countries known as the G9.56 Canada’s presence in both the G9 and the Quad 
provided the necessary link for reaching an agreement with the US, the EU, and Japan 
and for launching the Round in September 1986. During the Round, another coalition 
with the same characteristics played an important role in the agricultural negotiations. 
The Cairns Group pushed for the inclusion of agricultural negotiations on the agenda of 
the Round and supported the US’s calls for liberalization.57 
This change of attitude and strategy by the developing countries has been 
strengthened and consolidated as the Doha Round has progressed. The mixed coalitions 
                                                          
55 This group was formed by Bangladesh, Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Romania, Singapore, Sri Lanka, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, 
Uruguay, Zambia, and Zaire. 
56 The G9 was formed by Australia, Austria, Canada, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, 
and Switzerland. 
57 The Group consists of Argentina, Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the 
Philippines, Guatemala, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, South Africa, Thailand, and 
Uruguay. It was officially constituted on 3 August 1986. 
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of the Uruguay Round did not seek to oppose or question the great powers; what they 
sought to do was to restrict their behaviour or, at least, to influence it. Thus, the Café au 
Lait coalition sought to influence the issues on the agenda during the Uruguay Round, 
so that it would include matters of interest to both developing and developed countries. 
Meanwhile, the Cairns Group accepted the US-EU bilateral negotiations that led to the 
Blair House Agreement. In Doha, by contrast, the developing countries have wanted to 
play the game on their own and to assume the role of an effective counterforce.58 
The G20, unlike the Cairns Group, is not a mixed coalition. Formed exclusively 
of developing countries, the group is led by Brazil and India and counts China and 
South Africa among its members. The composition of this coalition began to take shape 
at the June 2003 meeting in Brasilia, when Brazil, India, and South Africa signed an 
agreement of mutual political trust. Subsequently, and in light of unfolding events, the 
group expanded.59 This group was formed to reject the US-EU pact on agriculture 
presented at the September 2003 Cancún Ministerial Conference. This pact sought to 
reproduce the situation at the Uruguay Round (following the Blair House Agreement), 
and the G20 did not allow this to happen. 
Coalition-building has not been easy among developing countries. One may 
argue that the G20 owes its origins to a change of strategy on the part of the Brazilian 
government in the WTO.60 In fact, in the G20, Brazil has been willing to temper its 
liberalizing ambitions in agriculture and to accept the demands of the more protectionist 
countries, such as India and China, centred on the protection of rural agriculture and on 
special and differential treatment.61 Brazil’s leadership effort may be attributed to a 
change in the orientation of the country's foreign policy.62 Under its former President 
                                                          
58 It should be noted that the G20 was not the only coalition of developing countries created for the Doha 
Round agricultural negotiations. There were other issue-based coalitions, such as the G33, as well as 
regional groups such as the African Group and formal criteria-based groups such as the Group of Least 
Developed Countries. Nevertheless, most commentators agree that the G20 is a particular case. As 
Kaukab put it: ‘This was the first time that a developing country alliance had worked as an active 
negotiating group instead of as a broader agenda-setting coalition’ (supra n. 53, p 142). 
59 The original countries of the G20 were: Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, South 
Africa, Thailand, and Venezuela. Later there were changes in the composition of the group: Egypt and 
Kenya joined, but various South American countries withdrew under pressure from the US. 
60 Sean W. Burges, Brazil as a Bridge between Old and New Powers?, 89 International Affairs 3, 577-594 
(2013). 
61 Mateo Diego-Fernández, Trade Negotiations Make Strange Bed Fellows, 7 World Trade Review 2, 
423–453 (2008); Haroldo Ramanzini Júnior and Marcelo Passini Mariano (2013), Brazil and the G-20: 
Domestic Pressures and the Construction of the Negotiating Position in the Doha Round of the WTO, 47 
Journal of World Trade 6, 1203-1224 (2013); Kaukab, supra n. 53. 
62 Sean W. Burges, Consensual Hegemony: Theorizing Brazilian Foreign Policy after the Cold War, 22 
International Relations 1, 65-84 (2008). 
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Lula da Silva, Brazil old ‘globalist’ perspective was largely abandoned and replaced by 
a ‘global South’ strategy. ‘The idea of Brazil as a bridge between the North and the 
South was firmly entrenched in Brazilian foreign policy during the Lula years’.63 As a 
result, Brazil has sought and continues to seek to lead the defence of the interests of the 
developing countries—above all on matters related to international commerce.64 It has 
taken up the North-South discourse of the mid-late 1980s’ G10. 
In any case, the EU has found itself facing a much more complex situation in 
Doha, characterized by a resurgence of the traditional confrontation between North and 
South and by the increased capabilities of the developing countries of the WTO to form 
sufficiently influential coalitions through which to achieve their goals. What we are 
seeing is a new international stage: on which the emerging countries wish to play a 
leading role in decisions that have a global impact and where agriculture has become the 
main item on their agenda. 
Furthermore, this stage does not seem likely to change in the foreseeable future. 
The G20 has consolidated its position in the WTO and has managed to survive the 
pressures for its dismantling both during and after Cancún.65 Narlikar and Tussie have 
argued that this group has managed to survive for several reasons: first, because it 
combines two types of coalition, one centred on the defence of an issue and one centred 
on the defence of its bloc interests; second, because it has successfully found a balance 
between the distinct aspirations of its members; third, because it is technically well 
prepared; and, fourth, because it is constructive, i.e. it is willing to negotiate.66 
 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
In recent years, it has been possible to observe a number of cases where the EU’s high 
degree of internal coherence has not been matched by the ability to affect outcomes in 
international affairs. Surprisingly, this phenomenon occurs not only in less developed 
                                                          
63 Burges, supra n. 60, p. 580. 
64 Marcus de Faro de Castro and Maria Isabel Valladao de Carvalho (2003), Globalization and Recent 
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66 Supra n. 28. 
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common policy areas such as foreign and security affairs, but also in traditional core 
policies of the EU, most notably the CAP. This suggests that coherence as such is not a 
sufficient condition for more EU influence on the international stage and, consequently, 
should not be over-emphasized, as many policy-makers do. In international agricultural 
trade negotiations in particular, even more European coherence through internal 
adjustments of decision-making procedures or more Commission autonomy would 
hardly change the overall outcomes of these negotiations. As has been shown by a 
diachronic comparison of two instances of international agricultural trade negotiations 
during the Uruguay and Doha Rounds, it has been rather the change in the nature of the 
negotiating context that has weakened the influence of the EU in these negotiations. 
More specifically, underpinned by ideological changes regarding trade negotiations in 
the context of the GATT and WTO, emerging powers such as Brazil have played 
increasingly pro-active roles in the negotiations and have proven to be effective 
coalition-builders—to the detriment of the EU and US. In short, emerging powers have 
learnt to translate their growing commercial power into effective strategies to wield 
more influence in international trade negotiations. 
So far, this influence is still limited. The ‘decline of the West’ is still waiting to 
happen, as Cox already argued.67 During the Cancún talks of the Doha Round, for 
example, developing countries were only able to block a new ‘Blair-House-style’ 
agreement. However, they could not impose their own agreement on the EU and US. 
Nevertheless, comparing the influence of the EU relative to that of emerging powers 
during the Uruguay and Doha Rounds, the trend over time becomes evident: the relative 
influence of the EU has declined. Similar developments have also occurred in other 
areas, most notably with respect to international environmental negotiations (Kilian and 
Elgström, 2010).68 Therefore, the habitual analyses of the internal working mechanisms 
inside the EU are not sufficient to grasp fully the EU’s global influence. In this sense, 
there exists a gap between what is being researched and the ability to link EU policies 
with certain outcomes at the international level. Likewise, reducing the external 
dimension of this influence merely to a vaguely defined increase in the commercial 
power of other actors—as has become all too common—simplifies too much the 
realities on the ground. In order to better understand the EU in international affairs it is 
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necessary to analyze how other international players act—and, above all, interact with 
each other and with the EU. In international negotiations, this interaction is reflected by 
the willingness and ability to build effective coalitions. In other words, it is not only 
important to ascertain what third countries think of the EU, but also how their actions 
impact the EU’s room for manoeuvring. 
What are the policy implications that arise from these research results? To begin 
with, the correlation between EU coherence and influence is not as obvious as policy-
makers and think tank reports want to make us believe. More coherence is not a panacea 
for the EU’s shortcomings in international affairs. Yet, coherence is not a counter-
productive factor either. The point is rather that the attention should shift from too 
narrow a focus on coherence to other factors that are equally or even more important. In 
the case of international trade negotiations, the research results suggest at least two 
concrete steps. First, the EU has to more consciously adapt its negotiation approaches to 
new negotiation environments. Simply forming blocks centred on the EU-US axis no 
longer works in the same way as before. This implies that the EU has to pay more 
attention to effective pre-negotiation strategic planning than to fine-tuning internal 
coordination or to hammering out stringent common negotiation positions. More 
specifically, the EU has to learn (again) to engage other actors on an individual basis 
and prevent the emergence of strong counter-coalitions, in particular among emerging 
powers. Improved coordination with the United States or better use of issue linkages 
with other trade areas are just two examples of how to achieve this. Second, the EU, and 
in particular member states, must adapt their expectations to what can be realistically 
achieved in international negotiations. After all, the increasing influence of emerging 
powers means that it is not possible anymore to achieve major negotiation results 
without painful concessions. This is particularly true in the agricultural sector. 
